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THE NEW JUDICIAL APPROACH TO DUE PROCESS
AND PRICE FIXING
The distinction between the "business affected with a public
interest," subject therefore to governmental regulation of its
charges, and the ordinary "private" business,' not affected by
such an interest and therefore protected against price regulation
by judicial '"interpretati6n" of the due process clauses in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, dates from Munn v.
Illi ois.2 By successive decisions the doctrine of that case was
developed until in 1923 Chief Justice Taft felt able to announce
the result in the following language:
"Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying
some public regulation may be divided into three classes.
"(1)
Those which are carried on under the authority of a public
grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affrmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member
of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.'
"(2)
Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived
the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or Colonial legislatures for
regulating all trades and callings. (Citing cases).
"(3)
Businesses which, though not public at their inception, may
be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject in
consequence to some government regulation. They have come to
hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed
upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner, by devoting his.
business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in
that use, and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of
that interest, although the property continues to belong to its private
'"The
distinction between the private callings-the rule-and the
public callings-the exception-is the most consequential division in
the law governing our business relations." Wyman, The Law of the
Pubic Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem (1904) 17 Harv. L.
Bev. 151.
294 U. S. 113 (1877).
'Apparently the Chief Justice here uses the term, public utilities,
in its narrow sense, referring to services such as the supply of gas,
water, electricity and telephone and telegraph service, involving usually
the use of eminent domain or franchise rights.
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owner, and to be entitled to protection accordingly.
inois and other cases.]"'

[Citing Munn v.

Farther down in the opinion he added: "The circumstances
which clothe a particular kind of business with a public interest,
in the sense of Munn v. Ilinois and the other cases, must be
such as to create a peculiarly close relation between the public
and those engaged in it, and raise implications of an affirmative
obligation on their part to be reasonable in dealing with the
public.'"5
There is a certain unfortunate ambiguity in the reference to
"Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying
some public regulation." One might infer thlat the learned Chief
Justice meant to suggest that no business could be regulated in
any respect unless "clothed with a public interest." If interpreted to mean that the due process guaranty against arbitrary
governmental acts precludes any regulation not reasonably related to advancing some public interest, the statement might
command our assent. But if it means that a business must have
the characteristics of those later enumerated as "clothed with
a public interest" before it may be regulated at all, we
must dissent. All the "police power" cases demonstrate the
falsity of such a contention. It is clear, however, from the context that the Chief Justice is referring to the special type of
regulation, looking to the enforcement of the duty to serve all
without unjustifiable discrimination and at reasonable prices,
which we associate with the control of the common callings or
public utilities, using the latter term in its broad sense. So
construed, we may accept the statement as an authoritative summary of the status of the law with respect to the permissible
range of this type of regulation. The language of course is dictum in the sense that it was not necessary to the decision of the
case. Regulation of wages, involved in the legislation there
under examination, may implicate different factors from those
affecting the constitutionality of a price fixing statute. 6 But
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U. S. 522, 535, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 632 (1923).

:262 U. S. at 536, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
"The regulation of rates to avoid monopoly is one thing. The
regulation of wages is another. A business may be of such a character that only the first is permissible, while another may involve such
a possible danger of monopoly on the one hand, and such disaster from
stoppage on the other, that both come within the public concern and
power of regulation." Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of neustrial Relations, supra note 4 at 539, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634.
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the deliberate and considered dictum of the chief justice of the
nation's highest court, when speaking for that court, is entitled
to serious consideration as a statement of the law, and it has
been accorded at least lip service in subsequent cases.7
The statement furnishes, a reasonably definite and workable
rationalization of the decisions as to the field for legislative ex-,
tension of what has been termed the "public category" 8 of
employments. The callings historically public (group two) presumably will continue to be regarded as legitimately subject to
appropriate regulation. For further extension of the field we
are referred to two possible avenues of development. The first
is through the "public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly impose the affirmative duty of rendering
a public service." Franchises and the right of eminent domain
are quite evidently regarded by the court as grants which come
within this description. 9 Others which may be included are
the privilege of using the public highways as a car~ier 1 and
the regulated monopoly or partial monopoly created by the certificate of public convenience and necessity." 1 The mere licensing
of a business, a recent case 12 makes clear, does not constitute
such a grant as will justify public utility regulation.
The other avenue for extending the public category, the list
of businesses "clothed with a public interest" named by the
13
Chief Justice in his third classification, opens a wider vista.
Obviously no attempt is made here to fix a rule for the determination of public interest. Rather it is a method of approach to
the problem that is suggested. We are told that "the owner by
7 See Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 431, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 428
(1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 355, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928).
3 See Robinson, Cases and Authorities on Public Utilities (1926)
9, 43.
9 See extract quoted ante p.
20This would seem beyond doubt but for the extremely questionable
decision in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271
U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
- Frost & Frost Trucking-Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra note
10, threatens this view also. But cf. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16
Wall. (U. S.) 36 (1873) and Frost v. Corporation Commission, - U.
S. -, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (1929).
Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 7.
"It is very difficult under the cases to lay down a working rule
by which readily to determine when a business has become "clothed
with a public-interest." Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, supra note 4 at 538, 43 Sup. CtL at 634.
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devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public
an interest in that use, and subjects himself to public regulation
to the extent of that interest, although the property continues
to belong to its private owner,, and to be entitled to protection
accordingly.' '14 Clearly this is the language of fiction. Very
rarely does the owner of an unregulated business grant the public an interest therein in the sense of inviting or voluntarily submitting to public utility regulation. What is meant is that circumstances justify such regulation, make it reasonable in the
eyes of the court and so enable it to escape the due process ban.
The problem is to know what circumstances create a public interest sufficient to bring this fictitious grant into being. We are
told that this interest is present when the business has come to
'
hold "a peculiar relation to the public,' "1
when circumstances
"create a peculiarly close relation between the public and those
engaged" in the business,"' "when the public becomes peculiarly
dependent upon a particular business.' ' 7 All this of course is
vague and indefinite. The nearest approach to an authoritative
statement of the circumstances justifying regulation is the
sentence reading, "In nearly all the businesses included under
the third head above, the thing which gave the public interest
was the indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant
charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected without regulation."' s Otherwise we are referred to the
empiricism of a "process of exclusion and inclusion, and to
gradual establishment of a line of distinction.' ' 9
But precisely to its vagueness and its empiric attitude
toward the problem this method of approach owes its usefulness.
Certain definite datum points are given us. Ordinarily the
service should be indispensable, i. e. a "necessity" of life as
distinguished front a mere "luxury."
The existing circumstances must be such as to expose the patrons to the danger of
"exorbitant charges and arbitrary control." This may, in most
eases perhaps does, spring from the existence of monopoly, legal
"Ibid. at 535, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
Ibid.
"Ibid. at 536, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.

'Ibid, at 538, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634.
1Ibid.

"Ibid, at 639, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634.
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or virtual, but it need not do so. 20 The cases prior to the Wolff
case show that application of this aproach to the problem in line
with the datum posts set up in the opinion in that case. In all
the cases the service involved has been one which may be termed
a "necessity" in the sense of being in common use either for
meeting the essential needs of life or for maintaining economic
activity according to the standards of the time and place. In
most of the cases virtual monopoly has been the factor which
furnished the possibility of oppression and abuse in the supply of
the necessity, justifying regulation, 21 but other circumstances,
such as the existence of disparity in bargaining power between
the business and its patrons, 22 concert of action among nominal
competitors not amounting to mechanical monopoly,2 3 the needs
of government, 4 and even the fact that the business through
past regulation under special circumstances has come to be
25
regarded as a fit subject for regulation under all conditions
have also been relied upon.
The picture that we get, then, reading the opinion of the
Chief Justice in the light of the cases preceding it with reference
to which it is written, is of an intensely practical, empiric approach to the problem of deciding when regulation is permissible. Each case is to be decided upon its own circumstances.
Refusal to permit regulation at one time does not necessarily
preclude approval under changed conditions. Government is
20 Cf. Rottschaefer, The Field of Governmental Price Control,
(1926) 35 Yale L. J. 438, 451-456.
21 Munn v. Illinois, supra note 2; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517,
12 Sup. Ct. 468 (1891); The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct.
956 (1914); Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U. S. 39, 27 Sup. Ct. 483 (1917).
"Budci v. New York, supra note 21; German Alliance Ins. Co v.
Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.
S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S.
495, 42 Sup. Ct: 397 (1922); possibly also Brass v. North Dakota, 153
U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1893) though point is not discussed.
2 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, supra note 22; Stafford, v.
Vallace, supra note 22.
24Block v. Hirsh, supra note 22.
2 Brass v. North Dakota, supra note 22, in which the court said:
"When it is once admitted, as it is admitted here, that it is competent
for the legislative power to control the business of elevating and storing grain.

.

.

. in cities of one size and under some circumstances,

it follows that such power may be legally exerted over the same busi"ness when carried on in smaller cities and in other circumstances."
153 U. S. at 403, 14 Sup. Ct. at 862.
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accorded freedom to deal with new problems and to have its
solutions reviewed by the court in the light of the existing situation and of current political thought. Effective action today
is not prohibited because statesmen and judges of the past were
not confronted -with the present problem or did not recognize
its importance. "New occasions teach new duties; time makes
ancient good uncouth." The court gives full recognition to this
changing power of the years. Each age may apply its own solution to its own problems. The only limitation which the due
process clauses impose is that the solution be reasonable under
contemporary conditions and the burden of proof is upon him
who claims it to be unreasonable. This is the judicial process
at its best in the realm of constitutional law.
Three recent decisions seem to involve, at least on the 'part
of the writer of the opinions therein, a radical departure from
this realistic method. Because of this apparent break with the
established technique in dealing with questions of this sort, some
examination of these opinions seems in order.
Tyson v. Banton2 O comes first in point of time. It involved
the validity of a New York statute limiting the price of theater
tickets, on resale by licensed brokers, to a maximum of fifty
cents in excess of the price printed on the tickets. The fact
situation back of the statute as disclosed by the record was that
the New York City theaters habitually sold to the brokers, in
advance of the production of their plays, the best seats, "usually
the first 15 rows," for a period of eight weeks. The resultant
virtual monopoly of the best seats allowed the brokers to com2
mand extortionate prices and to realize exorbitant profits. Y
There was no contention that the limitation of fifty cents profit
would render the business unremunerative. The Supreme Court,
by five votes to four, held the act invalid.
The majority opinion, written by 1r. Justice Sutherland,
after stating the orthodox doctrine as to businesses "affected with
a public use" and reviewing the past decisions upon the subject,
says "each of the decisions of this court upholding governmental
price regulation, aside from cases involving legislation to tide
over temporary emergencies, has turned upon the existence of
1Supra note 7.
'See

at 435.

dissenting opinion of Stone,

. 273 U. S. at 450, 47 Sup. CL
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conditions, peculiar to the business under consideration, which
bore such a substantial and definite relation to the public interest
as to justify an indulgence of the legal fiction of a grant by the
owner to the public of an interest in the use." Barring the
rather unfortunate reference to "the legal fiction of a grant
..
..
to the public of an interest in the use" in place of
straight out recognition that the existence of circumstances
creating sufficient "public interest" in the business justifies
regulation regardless of any "grant by the owner," real or fictitious, 28 this seems a fair enough statement of the orthodox
position. But the opinion goes on in its application of the principle in a manner that seems highly unorthodox Lord Hale, it
is said, in first using the phrase "affected with a public interest"
clearly did not have theaters in mind. This is indicated by the
illustrations which he used. Moreover, theaters are not like the
businesses in which regulation of charges heretofore has been
upheld, such as grain elevators, stockyards, insurance companies
or orthodox "public utilities." Nor can attendance thereat "be
regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an
emergency.''29 Tn addition, theaters never have been subject to
price regulation."0 All this is stated solemnly as matter of great
significance in the face of the fact that nothing in any prior
opinion of the Supreme Court indicates that either Lord Hale's
conception of what specific businesses were "affected with a publie interest" in his day, likeness to already recognized public
utilities, freedom from regulation in the past or all of these
combined constitute a limitation on the constitutional power of
legislatures to extend the public utility concept. But finally,
after it has been sufficiently demonstrated that theaters are -not
like the businesses subjected to price regulation in the past, and
have not themselves been regulated, nor, apparently, regarded
as fit subjets for such regulation, brief attention is paid to the
particular fact situation dealt with by the legislature in this case
in the statement that if evils, such as "fraud, extortion, collusive
arrangements between the management and those engaged in
reselling tickets, and the like," exist they "are to be suppressed
C. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, (1928)
41 Harv. L. Rev. 277, 294.
-9273 U. S. at 440, 47 Sup. Ct. at 431.
20273 U. S. at 441, 47 Sup. Ct. at 431.
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or prevented by legislation which comports with the Constitution, and not by such as strikes down the essential rights of
private property protected by that instrument against undue
governmental interference.' '31 This begs the question whether
the statute violates the Constitution.' Seemingly there is no
recognition whatever that the constitutional validity of the reguIation depends upon the existence of the evils enumerated and
the reasonableness of price regulation as a remedy.
The objection is not so much to the result as to the method
by which it is reached. The actual decision is one which can be
arrived at with entire prop~riety under the method heretofore
in vogue for dealing with price fixing statutes. While a clear
case of virtual monopoly and of extortionate charges against
which the patron may not protect himself save by abstinence
from attendance at the theater seems made out, 32 one may agree
that the service probably is-not "indispensable."
Granting that
the decision does give "free rein to shear all the fleece from the
theatre going lambs of greater New York,'' 33 and places the
rather sordid shearing process under the sacred aegis of the
Constitution, there may be good reason to feel that those lambs
who cannot protect themselves by avoiding the shearing pens are
not sufficiently numerous nor are they of sufficient importance
to the commonweal to warrant classifying the service in the
ranks of those which are "indispensable" to the general welfare.3 4 But the method by which the decision is reached seems
indefensible. The majority opinion, boiled down, may be rendered thus: "Theaters never have been subjected to price regulation. They are different from the businesses that have been
subjected to price regulation. It never occurred to Lord Hale
that they could be subjected to price regulation. Therefore government may not regulate their prices, no matter what evils
exist with reference to charges and even though such evils are
peculiarly amenable to cure by price regulation and by no other
form of control.'' 35 This is a complete abandonment of the ema 273 U. S. at 442, 47 Sup. Ct. at 431.

This is strongly demonstrated in the dissenting opinion of Stone,

3. 273 U. S. at 450, 47 Sup. Ct. at 435.
See (1927) 25 Mich L. Rev. 880.
1See (1927) 13 Ia. L. Rev. 99; (1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 554. See also
Stone, 3. dissenting in Ribnf v. McBride, supra note 7 at 362, 48 Sup.
Ct. at 548.
=iupranote 1.

DuE PRocEss

ANWD

PRICE FIXING

pirical, practical, open minded attitude prevalent from Munn
v. Illinois to Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations.3 6
Next in order comes Ribnik v. McBride.3 7 The law there
under fire was a New Jersey statute providing for the licensing
of employment agencies and requiring, as a prerequisite to the
issuance of a license, the filing of a schedule of fees with the
commissioner of labor, to be approved by that officer. Adherence to the schedule so approved was commanded. The statute
was struck down by a six to three vote, Mr. Justice Sanford,
who had dissented in the Tyson case, concurring solely on the
ground of his inability to distinguish between the two cases. 38
The prevailing opinion again is by Mr. Justice Sutherland.
He declares that the crucial point is whether the business falls
within the third category of the Wolff case 39 and then proceeds
to depart completely from the method approved in that case for
the solution of the problem. After quoting extracts from the
Wolff case, from Tyson v. Banton and from his own opinion in,
Adkins t. Children's Hospital,4" he comes definitely to the disposition of the case by the statement that Tyson v. Banton held
it unconstitutional to regulate the charges of a theater ticket
broker and that he can see no difference between the business of
an employment broker and that of "a real estate broker, ship
broker, merchandise broker, or ticket broker.''4 1 Automatically
the result follows that the act is invalid. The general rule is
laid down that "Under the decisions of this court it is no longer
fairly open to question that, at least in the absence of a grave
emergency, 42 the fixing of prices for food or clothing, of house
rental or of wages to be paid, whether maximum or minimum, is
beyond the legislative power." 43 This statement is, to say the
least, astounding. Its vice is that, save with respect to wages, 4 1
U Supra note 4.
Spra note 7.
See concurring opinion of Sanford, J. 277 U. S. at 359; 48 Sup.
Ct. at 547.
Supra note 4.
261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
277 U. S. at 356, 48 Sup. Ct. at 546.

Citing Tyson v. Banton, supra note 7.
277 U. S. at 357, 48 Sup. Ct. at 546.
"Adkin v. Children's Hospital, supra note 40; Murphy v. Sardel,
269 U. S. 530, 46 Sup. Ct. 22 (1925) Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co.,,
273 U. S. 657, 47 Sup. Ct. 343 (1927); CharZes WoZff Packing Ca. v.
Court of IncLustrial Relations, supra note 4.
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it is, to use the mildest term that is adequately descriptive, utterly inaccurate. No case decided by the Supreme Court has
ever held generally that price fixing in respect to food, clothing
or house rent is invalid. The only cases which have directly involved governmental regulation of such charges resulted in decisions sustaining the regulation.4 5 It is true that in the Wolff
case. Chief Justice Taft did say: "It has never been supposed,
since the adoption of the Constitution, that the business of the
butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the mining
operator or the miner was clothed with such a public interest
that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by State
regulation. It is true that in the days of the early common law
an omnipotent Parliament did regulate prices and wages as it
chose, and occasionally a Colonial legislature sought to exercise
the same power; but nowadays one does not devote one's property or business to the public use or clothe it with a public interest merely because one makes commodities for, and sells to,
the public in the common callings of which those above mentioned are instances." 46 But the statement was made by way
of illustrating the normal situation where competitive conditions
afford adequate protection to the public against the rapacity
of the proprietor. When read in connection with the entire
opinion of the Chief Justice in the light of the course of decisions
upon which that opinion is founded, it clearly indicates that he
was not undertaking to lay down an absolute constitutional immunity of these activities from price regulation. His dictum
was merely that circumstances justifying regulation thereof had
not yet arisen. Mr. Justice Sutherland's position is quite different. He says:
"To urge that extortion, fraud, imposition, discrimination, and the
like have been practiced to some, or to a great, extant in connection
with the buszness here under consideration, or that the business is one
lending itself peculiarly to such evils, is simply to restute grounds
already fulhy considered by this court. These are grounds for regulation, but not for price fixing as we have already definitely decided." 4,
5.Block v. Hirsh, supra note 22; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, supra note 22.
48262 U. S. at 537, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
47
277 U. S. at 358, 48 Sup. Ct. at 547.
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This again completely repudiates the prior method of dealing with rate fixing statutes. Specific evils, the conditions prevailing in the particular business, "the indispensable nature of
the service and the exorbitant charges and arbitrary control to
which the public might be subjected without regulation,''14 are
all of absolutely no significance. If the business has not been
regulated as to prices in the past, or is not completely analogous
to one which has been thus regulated, it is immune, regardless
of fraud, discrimination, oppression, extortion, rapacity or outright robbery under the guise of legitimate economic activity.
"These are grounds for regulation, but not for price fixing.
. " Just how evils which find their root in the prices charged
are to be eliminated other than by price fixing the learned justice does not inform us.
Last in this trilogy is Williams v. Standard Ol. Co.,4 9 involving a Tennessee statute authorizing an administrative tribunal to fix prices to be charged for gasoline and prohibiting rebates, price concessions, and price discrimination between persons or localities. The act of course was overturned. Mr. Justice Sutherland for the third successive time in cases of this
character spoke for the court. The opinion adds little to the
two preceding; its significance lies in the emphasis that is placed
upon them as authoritative statements of the law. A short quotation will suffice to indicate its character.
"It is settled by recent decisions of this court that a state Legislature is without constitutional power to fix prices at which commodities
may be sold, services rendered, or property used, unless the business
is 'affected with a public interest.' O Nothing is gained by.reiterating
the statement that the phrase is indefinite. By repeated decisions of
this court, beginning with Munn v. Illinois," that phrase, however it
may be characterized, has become the essential test by which the legislative power to fix prices of commodities, use of property, or services,
must be measured.

.

.

.

The meaning and application of the phrase

are examined at length in the Tyson Case and we see no reason for
restating what is there said.
Supra note 18.
I'-

U. S. -

, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929).

0 Citing Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations,
supra note 4; Tyson v. Banton, supra note 7; Fairmont Creamery Co.
v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 506 (1927); Ribnilk v. McBride,
supra note 7.

f Supra note 1.
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"In support of the act under review it is urged that gasoline is oi
widespread use; that enormous quantities of it are sold in the state of
Tennessee; and that-it has become necessary and indispensable in carrying on commercial and other activities within the state. But we are
here concerned with the character of the business, not with its size
or the extent to which the commodity is used. Gasoline is one of the
ordinary commodities of trade, differing, so far as the question here is
affected, in no essential respect from a great variety of other articles
commonly bought and sold by merchants and private dealers in the
country. The decisions referred to above make it perfectly clear that
the business of dealing in such articles, irrespective of its extent, does
not come within the phrase 'affected with a public interest.' Those
decisions control the present case."B'
Comment seems superfluous.

The mere fact that "Gas-

oline is one of the ordinary commodities of trade" is sufficient to
condemn the legislation. "Dealing in such articles, irrespective
of its extent," cannot be the subject of price control. Once
more we have the enunciation of an absolute constitutional prohibition against governmental price fixing except in those fields
where it gains sanction from past practice.
The actual decision may be justified. It appears that no
showing of the monopoly was made, and perhaps it is too much to
urge that the Supreme Court, merely because practically all
filling stations in the same trade territory display an identical
schedule of prices, should judicially notice that competition
does not materially control the price of gasoline. At any rate,
Justices Stone and Brandeis, who have manfully insisted upon
the application of the traditional technique in the two prior
cases, 5 3 concur in the result here, leaving only Justice Holmes
49 Sup. Ct. at 116.
"Statutory regulation of price is commonly directed toward the
prevention of exorbitant demands of buyers or sellers. An examination
of the decisions of this court in which price regulation has been upheld
will disclose that the element common to all is the existence of a situation or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at such
a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious economic consequences result to a very large number of members of the community.
Whether this situation arises from the monopoly conferred upon public
service companies or from the circumstances that the strategical
position of a group is such as to enable it to impose its will in matters
of price upon those who sell, buy or consume, . . . or from the
predetermination of prices in the councils of those who sell, promulgated in schedules of practically controlling constancy, . . . or
from a housing shortage growing out of a public emergency, .
the result is the same. Self-interest is not permitted to invoke constitutional protection at the expense of the public interest and reason,2
"
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to hold out for the freedom of the legislature as distinguished
from the freedom of the gasoline vender. But, as has been suggested heretofore, the alarming thing about these cases is not
the character of the results reached. Only Ribnik v. McBride5 4
seems utterly unjustifiable under the standards heretofore applied in cases of this nature. The sinister aspect of the situation lies in the apparent abandonment of the fruitful practicality of the method of approach to which expression was given in
the Wolff case in favor of a rigidly unyielding judicial prohibition against further extension of the public utility concept.
For it is difficult to see how under the method employed by
Mr. Justice Sutherland in these cases there can be any broadening of that concept. To him, the list of businesses already ineluded therein constitutes a closed category. And the disquieting thing is that he carries with him in silent acquiescence the
majority of the court, including the author of the opinion in
the Wolff case. 55 In a day when consolidation and merger are
prevalent in all businesses, when commerce and industry of
every sort tend to consolidate into a comparatively few large
units organized upon a national scale, when the common man is
more and more often faced with the alternative of "take it or
leave it" both as to what he receives for his property or his
labor and as to what he pays for the necessities of life, it is a
grave matter to be told that government may be without cap-

able regulation of price is upheld.'

Stone, J. dissenting in Tyson v.
Banton, supra note 7 at 451, 47 Sup. Ct. at 435, Holmes and Brandeis,
3J. concurring.
"Under the decisions of this court not all price regulation, as distinguished from other forms of regulation, is forbidden. As those
decisions have been explained, price regulation is within the constitutional power of a state Legislature when the business is 'affected with
a public interest.' That phrase is not to be found in the Constitution.
Concededly it is incapable of any precise definition. It has and can
have only such meaning as may be given to it by the decisions of this
court. As I read those decisions, such regulation is within a state's
power whenever any combination of circumstances seriously curtails
the regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed
at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a Legislature
might reasonably anticipate serious consequences to the community
as a-whole." Stone, J. dissenting in Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 7
at 359, 48 Sup. Ct. at 547, Holmes and Brandeis, JJ. concurring.
11Supra note 7.

51Mr. Justice Sutherland's own position is not surprising in view
of the sentiments expressed in his presidential address to the American
Bar Association in 1917. See Sutherland, Private Rights and Govern,
ment Control, (1917) 85 Cent. L. T. 168.
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acity to curb abuses by the lords of industry and of commerce of
the absolute power which their position may give them in the
not far distant future.
But it seems clear that government will not be so fettered.
The almost universal dissent which the appearance of this new
doctrine has evoked 56 demonstrates its untenable nature. Judicial
statesmanship, unafraid to abandon prior positions when their
erroneous character becomes appareit, has ever marked the
course of the Supreme Court in the field of constitutional law.
The due process clauses constitute the only barrier to government
price fixing, as such. Due process on its substantive side protects
against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action only.
When freedom of the entrepeneur in respect to prices becomes
the source of abuse in any enterprise, effective control must
depend upon state price regulation. Under such circumstances,
"6But two comments have been found approving Tyson v. Banton,
both on the ground that theaters do not furnish indispensable sermice.
See (1927) 13 Ia. L. Rev. 99; (1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 554. The others are
purely expository: see (1927) 7 Boston U. L. Rev. 208; (1927) 11 Minn.
L. Rev. 656; 1 St. John's L. Rev. 212; or vehement in disap
proval; see Kinkelstein, from Munn v. 41linois to Tyson v. Banton
(1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 769; Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (1928)
28 Coal. L.
Rev. 708, 711; Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 277, 289-293; (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1009;
(1927) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 192; (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 880; (1927) 2 U.
Cinn. L. Rev. 80; (1927) 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 778; (1927) 36 Yale L. X.
985. Nobody loves Ribnik v. McBride. Nobody could. The following
comments are purely expository: (1928) 8 Boston U. L. Rev. 292;
(1929) 2 Marq. L. Rev. 114; (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 307; (1929) 14 St.
Louis L. Rev. 83. All others disapprove. See Hamilton, Price Fixing by State Legislatures, (1928) 3 Temple L. Q. 28; (1928) 17 Calif.
L. Rev. 55; (1928) 14 Corn. L. Q. 75; (1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 126;
(1929) 23 111.
L. Rev. 611; (1928) 7 N. C.L. Rev. 81; (1928) 3 St.
John's L. Rev. 104; (1929) 2 So. Calif. L. Rev. 277; (1929) 3 U. Cinn.
L. Rev. 69; (1928) 38 Yale L. J. 225. Williams v. Standard Oil Coo. is
too recent to have evoked much comment. (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 674
approves on the ground that "it is not clear that the competitive system
has failed to perform its regulatory function in the gasoline industry."
(1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 378 di.approves. (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 309
regards the case as "sound on authority" since the abuses present are
not so serious as in Ribnik v. McBride, but deplores the existing state
of authority; (1929) 3 Temp.' L. Q. 321 approves on the basis of past
decisions. (1929) 4 Ala. L. J. 214 Is expository and mildly approving.
(1929) 3 St. Johns L. Rev. 244 disapproves. Two recent articles dealing with the case are Witham, State Regulation of Busifess, (1929) 7
Tenn. L. Rev. 177, chiefly expository and taking the view that the case
does not for all time close the door against fixing the price of gasoline,
Kefauver, Legislative Price Control, (1929) 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 193, deploring the court's failure to approach the question of constitutionality
from the factual point of view.
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that regulation is not unreasonable and hence is not under the
due process ban. That has been the technique which the
Supreme Court has applied to this problem in the past. It is
the only method that affords adequate protection to the public
interest in a dynamic, growing, expanding social order. To it
we may be sure that the court will return eventually. Already
a federal district court has applied it, undeterred by the new
doctrine, in an opinion which deserves to be ranked with the
able dissents of Mr. Justice Stone in the Tyson and the Ribnik
cases. 57 The new method, sterile, barren, blighting, cannot survive.5 8 It deserves our profession's most deadly phrase of disapproval, "it is not the law."
MAURICE H. MERRL
Lincoln, Nebraska.
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U. S. 29 P. (2d) 750 (D. Neb. 1928).
"See also on this point Haugan, Vicissitudes of the Price Fixing
Doctrine, (1929) 2 Dak. L. Rev. 430, in which the new approach is
criticized.
3T

